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Abstract
Large-scale screening for potential threats with limited re-
sources and capacity for screening is a problem of interest
at airports, seaports, and other ports of entry. Adversaries
can observe screening procedures and arrive at a time when
there will be gaps in screening due to limited resource ca-
pacities. To capture this game between ports and adversaries,
this problem has been previously represented as a Stackelberg
game, referred to as a Threat Screening Game (TSG). Given
the significant complexity associated with solving TSGs and
uncertainty in arrivals of customers, existing work has as-
sumed that screenees arrive and are allocated security re-
sources at the beginning of the time window. In practice,
screenees such as airport passengers arrive in bursts corre-
lated with flight time and are not bound by fixed time win-
dows. To address this, we propose an online threat screening
model in which screening strategy is determined adaptively
as a passenger arrives while satisfying a hard bound on ac-
ceptable risk of not screening a threat. To solve the online
problem with a hard bound on risk, we formulate it as a Re-
inforcement Learning (RL) problem with constraints on the
action space (hard bound on risk). We provide a novel way to
efficiently enforce linear inequality constraints on the action
output in Deep Reinforcement Learning. We show that our
solution allows us to significantly reduce screenee wait time
while guaranteeing a bound on risk.
Introduction
Screening for potential threats entering large safety-sensitive
establishments (e.g., airports, seaports, museums) using the
right subset of available screening methods (e.g., metal de-
tectors, advanced imaging technology, pat-down) is an im-
portant defensive activity undertaken by various agencies
around the world. However, the sheer scale of the problem
at these large establishments with a large number of scree-
nees and various screening methods makes screening in a
timely fashion with limited resources quite challenging. For
example, average delays for air passengers in Chicago, USA
jumped to 2 hours due to higher passenger volume in the
summer of 2016 (Jeffrey Dastin 2016). Additionally, in-
telligent adversaries can exploit any gaps in screening and
cause catastrophic damage to these critical establishments.
Screening gaps can arise due to the use of a less effective
but faster screening method for high-risk passengers, which
can happen as the combination of more passengers and lim-
ited resources can result in the unavailability of the “right”
screening method.
Online resource allocation is a problem of interest in
many domains including transportation (Simao et al. 2009) –
allocating taxis to customers, emergency response (Maxwell
et al. 2010) – allocating ambulances to emergencies, and air-
ports – allocating terminals to arriving aeroplanes. Threat
screening is also an online resource allocation problem, but
in the presence of an observing adversary. Given that ad-
versaries can monitor resource allocation strategies and ex-
ploit any gaps, we consider robust or risk-averse objectives
rather than traditional expected objectives (e.g., expected
revenue, expected delay). Hence, game-theoretic models and
approaches have been considered for such problems.
One such model is the Threat Screening Game (TSG)
model introduced in Brown et al. (2016), where a strategic
attacker attempts to enter a secure area, while the screener
uses teams of limited capacity screening resources with
varying efficacy of catching the attacker to screen the scree-
nees. However, despite enhancements made in subsequent
work (McCarthy, Vayanos, and Tambe 2017), this model
suffers from a lack of adaptability as screening strategies
are fixed for every hour. Further, all versions of the model
assume a favourable rate of passenger arrival within each
time window such that no screening resource is idle within
the hour. We address these shortcomings with a novel online
allocation model and a completely new solution approach.
Our first contribution is an online version of the threat
screening problem, in which the screening strategy is de-
cided adaptively, based on the current queue lengths, as the
screenees arrive. We show experimentally that this leads to
a much better characterization and optimization of the av-
erage delay time faced by screenees at no loss to security
risk (measured as attacker utility) compared to past work.
Further, while past models have used a weight to balance
the risk of missing an attacker and average delay time, we
impose a hard bound on risk while simultaneously mini-
mizing delay. We show that, given uncertain and unknown
passenger arrivals, the online model can be solved as a Re-
inforcement Learning (RL) problem with continuous action
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space where the hard bound on risk translates to hard con-
straints on the action space. We show mathematically that
the choice of hard bound on risk is not different from the
one where a weighted defender objective is maximized and
we can switch back and forth between these two seemingly
different optimization goals. Our mathematical analysis also
reveals the game-theoretic nature of this formulation.
Our second contribution is a novel method to efficiently
impose hard constraints on actions in Deep RL by using
what we call α-projection. In contrast to prior approaches
(see Section ), our approach guarantees that the constraint is
never violated (even during training) while also being much
more scalable in training as well as execution. The main
component of our method is an extremely efficient mapping
of infeasible actions to the feasible space specified by the
constraints.
Finally, our third contribution is a set of experiments that
reveal why and how prior TSG models fail to handle realistic
continuous arrival of passengers in bursts. The experiments
also show that our approach achieves the same risk as prior
models but improves upon the average delay by 100% in the
best case and 25% on average. Overall, the realism of our
model coupled with a novel scalable RL solution method
makes our approach appealing for practical large scale threat
screening problems.
Related Work
TSG and Security Games
There have been quite a few papers published on various as-
pects of threat screening games. The early papers (Brown
et al. 2016; Schlenker et al. 2017) make two stringent
assumptions—first, they assume perfect prior knowledge of
passenger arrivals (for one hour time windows) and sec-
ond, they implicitly assume that all passengers are screened
within the same window in which they arrive, with no
screening resource being idle (thus, delay is not an explicit
consideration in this work). Both these assumptions are
unrealistic in practice as, clearly, there is uncertainty in the
number of passengers arriving in any time window and pas-
sengers arrive in bursts that are correlated with the flight tim-
ings. We show how these assumptions result in sub-optimal
outcomes in practice.
Later papers (McCarthy, Vayanos, and Tambe 2017; Mc-
Carthy et al. 2018) attempt to account for uncertainty in ar-
rivals across time windows and relax the second assumption
by allowing an overflow of passengers from one time win-
dow to next. However, their approach is simply unscalable
and hence impractical for real-world application. They show
solutions for only up to 15 flights for a full day. Additionally,
because the solution goal chosen is inspired from robust op-
timization, the method tries to find a solution that minimizes
risk and delay across any realizable sample, which results in
a pessimistic solution. The solution approach also makes the
approximation of calculating the worst case from a sample
of arrivals and, as a result, cannot guarantee that the solution
will bound the true worst-case risk. Moreover, a problematic
assumption from earlier work about the passengers arriving
at a favourable rate within a time window continues to be
assumed in this later work. In this paper, we propose a scal-
able online model without the restrictive assumptions of past
work: we guarantee a bound on the worst-case risk and si-
multaneously minimize the average delay. Our online model
allows for fine-grained adaptivity at the level of each pas-
senger arrival as opposed to the hourly time-window adap-
tations in past work and also scales up to a large number of
flights.
In other applications of security games played over mul-
tiple time steps, there has been work in which the de-
fender strategy is a policy for an MDP or a sequence of ac-
tions (Delle Fave et al. 2014; Bosansky et al. 2015). This
work assumes that the MDP or game parameters are known
beforehand and is hence a planning problem rather than a
learning problem. Additionally, there has been work in this
space where the double oracle approach has been used in
tandem with Deep RL to compute the equilibrium (Wang et
al. 2019; Wright, Wang, and Wellman 2019). In this work,
however, there is only a single constraint on actions (actions
sum to one), which is readily enforced using a softmax layer.
In this paper, our main contribution to Deep RL is in en-
forcing multiple arbitrary linear inequality constraints effi-
ciently. There is also theoretical work on solving security
games in an extensive form (Letchford and Conitzer 2010;
Kroer, Farina, and Sandholm 2018; Cˇerny`, Boy`ansky`, and
Kiekintveld 2018; Basilico, Gatti, and Amigoni 2009) or
stochastic game (Letchford et al. 2012) setting. Again, these
assume complete knowledge of the game structure includ-
ing transition functions whereas we focus on learning as-
pects. Also, whereas learning in the context of security
games has appeared in the literature (Balcan et al. 2015;
Letchford, Conitzer, and Munagala 2009), this paper intro-
duces an RL-based approach to threat screening for the first
time.
Constrained Action-Space RL
Historically, dealing with constraints on the action space in
Deep RL has been a challenging task. This is exacerbated
by the fact that our action space is continuous. The most
common and intuitive technique is to discourage disallowed
actions with a penalty. This method does not guarantee that
the security risk will be bounded, however, and given that the
risk is the worst-case allocation across an episode, the prob-
ability and extent of violation increases with scale. Given
the adversarial nature of the security problem, this method
is unsuitable.
Recently, Pham, De Magistris, and Tachibana (2018) have
suggested enforcing constraints by projecting any uncon-
strained point onto the constrained space by solving an opti-
misation program that minimises the L2 distance and back-
propagating through it to train the network (Amos and Kolter
2017). This approach is very time consuming as it requires
solving a quadratic program (QP) in the forward pass in ev-
ery training iteration and, as a result, does not scale to prob-
lems with large dimensional action spaces (Amos and Kolter
2017) seen in practical screening problems.
Our RL approach is similar in spirit to Bhatia, Varakan-
tham, and Kumar (2019), which uses a complicated variable-
length iterative approximation of the L2 projection to deal
with a specific subset of linear constraints faster than Pham,
De Magistris, and Tachibana (2018). The type of linear con-
straints they can handle are constraints on the sum of sets
of variables, where these sets must form a hierarchy. In con-
trast, the approach that we propose can handle arbitrary lin-
ear constraints, that is, in which the coefficients take any real
values. Moreover, our approach is simple, can be computed
in a single step, and is easy to implement as gradients can be
computed using automated symbolic differentiation.
MDP Model of TSG
Our main departure from past TSG work is that we deter-
mine the screening strategy for a passenger when they ar-
rive. Thus, while the model below reuses various notions
from past versions of the TSG model, it models the online
nature by formulating the problem as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP). The MDP treatment considerably simplifies
the problem of dealing with passenger arrival uncertainty by
incorporating those in the MDP transition model.
The basic structure of the screening problem stays the
same as prior TSG models: every arriving passenger has a
category c ∈ C, which is made up of two parts 〈θ, κ〉, where
θ is the part of the category that the attacker cannot con-
trol (risk level determined by screener) and κ is the part
that they can control (which flight to take). The screening
resource types comprise the set R; for example, R could be
{X-Ray, Metal Detector, Advanced imaging}. Each resource
type r ∈ R has a rate of screening (called capacity in prior
work) given by fr measured in units of passengers per unit
time. The passengers are screened by a team (set) of screen-
ing resources where the set of all teams T is given a priori
(T ⊂ 2R). An attacker, apart from choosing a flight, uses an
attack method m (e.g., knife or gun) and each team t has an
effectiveness (probability) Et,m of detecting attack method
m. U+κ,m is the defender’s utility for detecting an attacker
with attacker’s choice being κ,m and U−κ,m is the utility of
not doing so. As in previous TSG models, the adversary’s
utilities are the negation of these values. The defender has
a belief about the attacker’s uncontrollable category θ given
by Pθ with
∑
θ Pθ = 1.
MDP Model
Next, we describe our MDP formulation, which prescribes
an online screening strategy for each arriving passenger.
This is unlike past approaches in which the same random-
ized screening strategy was used for every passenger of a
given category that arrived in the same time window.
• States: The state at any given point in time is a combi-
nation of 4 quantities 〈c, ξ, h, τ〉. The first, c, is the cat-
egory of the passenger that has arrived for screening and
we have to allocate security resources to. The remaining
quantities summarise the history and provide information
about the current context. ξ ∈ R|R| encodes the number of
passengers (or part thereof) in the queue for each resource
at this current point in time. h ∈ Z+|C| is a summary of
the history: it is the number of passengers from every cat-
egory that have already been screened. τ is the wall clock
time when the passenger arrives.
• Actions: An action pit ∈ R|T | at time step t is a ran-
domized allocation of the just-arrived passenger to teams.
We use the insight that the risk is a function of the pol-
icy and does not depend on passenger arrivals to codify
the hard bound as risk as constraints on the action space.
Only actions with risk less than the specified risk level are
allowed. Risk in TSGs is measured as the expected ad-
versary utility, which is the negation of the utility of the
defender. This leads tom different inequalities constraints
(one for each attack method) on the action stated in terms
of defender utility.
Pθ ∗
[
zmU
+
κ,m + (1− zm)U−κ,m
] ≥ −ψθ ∀m, (1)∑
t∈T
Et,mpit = zm ∀m, and
∑
t∈T
pit = 1
Given a marginal policy pi, zm is the overall probability
that one of the teams t ∈ T will detect an attack of type
m. The last equality constraint enforces that pit is a prob-
ability distribution over teams. In order to explain the first
set of inequalities, we first state the defender detection
utility explicitly. Uκ,m = zmU+κ,m + (1− zm)U−κ,m is the
expected utility of the defender if the current passenger is
an attacker. The utility Uθ = minκ,m Uκ,m is the worst
case expected utility when the attacker is one with uncon-
trollable category θ.
∑
θ PθUθ is the overall defender de-
tection expected utility. We wish to impose a lower bound
−ψθ on PθUθ which indirectly lower bounds
∑
θ PθUθ
(or in other words, upper bounds risk). It is easy to see that
the first set of inequalities is Pθ ∗ (minm Uκ,m) ≥ −ψθ.
Since this inequality is applied for every passenger with
uncontrollable category θ, we get Pθ ∗ (minκ,m Uκ,m) ≥
−ψθ, which is nothing but PθUθ ≥ −ψθ. Thus, this guar-
antees that the overall defender detection expected utility∑
θ PθUθ ≥ −
∑
θ ψθ (or risk is bounded from above by∑
θ ψθ). As these inequalities hold for any choice of ac-
tion by attacker, this guarantees−∑θ ψθ detection utility
against a best responding attacker.
• Transitions: The transition from 〈c, ξ, h, τ〉 to
〈c′, ξ′, h′, τ ′〉 can be decomposed into three parts.
The first is how the allocation at the previous step and
passage of wall clock time since then affects the queues
for each resource. Passengers in the resources queues
are screened according to the screening rate of a given
resource:
ξ′r = max(ξr − (τ ′ − τ) ∗ fr, 0) for all r.
The second part controls h:
h′c = hc + 1, h
′
d = hc for all d 6= c.
The final part is determined by passenger arrivals and rep-
resents the likelihood of arrival of a passenger of a given
type at a given time P (c′, τ ′|h, c, t). This is a function of
the arrival history, but is unknown, which motivates our
use of RL for the problem.
• Rewards: The reward for each time step t is the negative
of the expected wait time of the currently arrived passen-
ger. The wait time is determined by the maximum wait
time over all resources in the realized team allocation. The
wait time for each resource r is determined by the screen-
ing rate fr and the number of passengers ξr already in
queue for that resource: ξr/fr. We use Uo,t to denote the
delay reward at time t (note Uo,t is negative). The value
(long term reward) is given by Vo = E[(1/N)
∑N
t=1 Uo,t],
whereN passengers arrive in a day (implicitly conditional
on the start state with empty history).
Relationship to Game Theory
In the above constrained RL problem, the defender learns
a policy which is a mixed strategy of the defender (mixed
since the allocation at each time step is randomized).
The adversary observes this policy and chooses an op-
timal attack a, which is a combination of κ and at-
tack method m. Thus, this is a Stackelberg game set-
ting, similar to prior models of TSG. There are two com-
ponents of the defender’s value function: (a) the risk of
not detecting the adversary, captured in
∑
θ PθUθ and (b)
the effect of delay, captured in Vo. The above RL ap-
proach solves the following problem maxpi∈Fψ Vo(pi) where
pi represents policies and Fψ = {pi | PθUθ(pit, a) ≥
−ψθ for all attacker actions a and all θ}. Observe that here
we explicitly write the arguments for Uθ and Vo. In par-
ticular, Vo does not depend on the attacker action and the
definition of Fψ ensures achieving a minimum of −
∑
θ ψθ
detection utility against a best responding adversary.
While the RL approach restricts the policy space of the
defender via a bound on risk, one may wonder if the de-
fender can achieve higher utility without such a restriction.
Another way to view the problem is where the defender op-
timizes
∑
θ PθUθ + w ∗ Vo over all possible pi without any
restrictions, where w is a constant weight that specifies the
relative importance of minimizing risk and average delay
time of passengers. While our approach requires the defence
agencies to specify acceptable risk level, this other approach
requires specifying a trade-off weight w between two com-
pletely different types of utilities (risk and delay), which is
why we feel the hard bound on risk is more natural. But, in
any case we show a relation between these two approaches
that allows us to switch back and forth between them.
Theorem 1. There exists a ψ (dependent on w) such that
any pi∗ ∈ argmaxpi∈Fψ Vo(pi) is the defender strategy part
of a Strong Stackelberg equilibrium of the Stackelberg game
defined with defender objective as
∑
θ PθUθ + w ∗ Vo.
Proof. An SSE is one which maximizes
∑
θ PθUθ +w ∗Vo,
subject to the best response of the attacker. The definition
Uθ = minκ,m Uκ,m already takes care of the best response
of the attacker as the attacker utility is −Uκ,m and the at-
tacker action κ,m that minimizes Uκ,m maximizes −Uκ,m.
Also, as Uκ,m is continuous in pi and min of continuous
functions is continuous,
∑
θ PθUθ is continuous in pi.
The space of possible pi is compact, thus, the continuous
bounded function
∑
θ PθUθ + w ∗ Vo of pi achieves a max-
imum at some pi∗ ∈ Π∗. This set Π∗ is the set of defender
strategies that form a SSE of the game. Let the value U∗θ and
V ∗o be obtained at this pi
∗.
Consider the values −ψ∗θ = PθU∗θ and ψ∗ = 〈ψ∗θ〉θ∈Θ.
Note that Fψ is specified by linear inequalities given by
Equation 1, thus, Fψ is a polytope. Also, pi∗ ∈ Fψ∗ . We
claim that the optimal solution of maxpi∈Fψ∗ Vo(pi) is in
Π∗ ∩ Fψ∗ , which is not empty as pi∗ ∈ Π∗ ∩ Fψ∗ . As∑
θ PθU
∗
θ +w∗V ∗o is the global maximum, for any pi ∈ Fψ∗
if
∑
θ PθUθ+Vo =
∑
θ PθU
∗
θ +V
∗
o then pi ∈ Π∗. And also,
there does not exist any pi ∈ Fψ∗ such that
∑
θ PθUθ+Vo >∑
θ PθU
∗
θ + V
∗
o , which proves our claim. Since the optimal
solution is in Π∗, this proves our result for ψ∗.
The above theorem also provides an easy algorithm to
solve for an approximate SSE in the unrestricted game us-
ing the RL approach. The approach is to construct a Pareto
frontier a priori by solving for the optimal policy for many
values of ψ where these values are uniformly spaced and
distributed throughout the possible space of ψ values. Then,
when given w, the solution will choose one of the specific
points for which the output pi maximizes
∑
θ PθUθ +w ∗Vo
over all points considered in the ψ space.
Overall Solution
To solve the screening problem modelled in Section , we use
Reinforcement Learning (RL). We use techniques from RL
instead of trying to solve the MDP directly because the exact
passenger arrival distribution is unknown. Rather than trying
to model the distribution explicitly, we use model-free RL
techniques to jointly learn the distribution and the optimal
policy.
Specifically, we use the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradi-
ent (DDPG) (Lillicrap et al. 2015) algorithm that is a state-
of-the-art technique in Deep Reinforcement Learning lit-
erature. DDPG is an extension of the standard actor-critic
approach that allows the modelling of a continuous action
space like the one present in our problem. However, DDPG
cannot enforce general action-space constraints as is.
To deal with this, we propose an α-projection layer in
Section that enforces constraints on the output of the pre-
vious layer. We then modify the standard DDPG algorithm
by adding this α-projection layer on top of the output layer
of the actor network. This ensures that any action produced
by the actor satisfies the risk constraints on the action space.
This combination of DDPG and α-projection represents the
overall approach that what we use to solve the MDP.
Approach for Linear Constraints on Action
Space in Deep RL
All prior approaches for imposing hard constraints on the
action output of any policy neural network use a layer(s)
at the end of the network to map the unconstrained output
from intermediate layers to an output in the feasible space.
Mathematically, suppose the output must lie in a feasible
space Y defined by linear inequality constraints. Let f(x)
be the output of the intermediate layer, given input x. The
last layer(s) define a mapping M such that M(f(x)) lies in
the feasible space Y . For our problem, Y is a fixed poly-
tope for a given problem instance (see Equation 1). Typi-
cally, such mappings M have been some type of Lp projec-
Center P1’
P1P1
Optimal
Figure 1: Left: The red points are produced by an interme-
diate layer. The α-projection is shown with cross marks. If
the red point is inside the feasible region, the α-projection
of the point is the point itself. For one red point (inside the
small dashed circle), the L2 projection is shown with the ar-
row. Right: A zoomed-in version of the dashed circle. This
shows that if the L2 projection of P1 is the optimal point
(green), then the intermediate layer will adjust its output to
P1’ to get the optimal point with the α-projection.
tion (p = 1 or 2) in the past. This projection is written as
an optimization problem and enforced as a neural network
layer using techniques such as OptLayer (Pham, De Mag-
istris, and Tachibana 2018). However, such mappings are
expensive to compute in practice as they require solving a
quadratic program for every training iteration and every ex-
ecution. This creates the case for a simpler mapping. First,
we list desirable properties of such a mapping.
• Onto: To make sure that the neural network has the oppor-
tunity to output any value in the feasible space. This en-
sures that there is no loss in solution quality arising from
a restricted solution space.
• Continuous everywhere and differentiable almost every-
where: This allows the neural network to learn through
this mapping layer by backpropagating gradients.1
• No vanishing or exploding gradients: The gradients of the
mapping should be informative when optimizing loss, that
is, should not be zero or very large for many points.
Observe that the mapping M need not be a closest point (in
any distance) in Y to the unconstrained f(x). This is because
the whole neural network is the function composition M ◦ f
and the training ensures that the output M ◦ f minimizes
the loss. The purpose of M is to only ensure feasibility of
output, thus, any choice of M (with the properties above)
will work since the neural network will appropriately adjust
f so that M ◦ f is optimal.
α-projection
We propose a very simple mapping M , which we call α-
projection. We start by finding a feasible point y0 ∈ int(Y ),
where int(Y ) are all the interior points of Y . Then, we find
the maximum α ∈ [0, 1] such that y = α ∗ f(x) + (1−α) ∗
y0 and y ∈ Y , with the final output being the point y, so
M(f(x)) = y. Intuitively, we join f(x) and y0 with a line
1Non-differentiability for points in a measure zero set are al-
lowed, as is in the ReLU activation.
and choose the closest point to f(x) on this line that lies in
Y , which could be f(x) itself if f(x) ∈ Y . See Figure 1.
Forward pass α-projection turns out to be very effi-
cient for linear constraints such as those in the TSG-RL
problem. For training neural networks, every iteration re-
quires a forward pass for the network also. An optimiza-
tion layer (such as our α-projection layer) requires solv-
ing an optimization problem. However, our simple map-
ping allows obtaining α in a closed-form with no need to
solve expensive optimizations. To get to the closed-form,
first, lets consider m inequality constraint with the ith con-
straint being ai · y ≤ bi. Using our mapping, this ith con-
straint is α ∗ (ai · f(x)) + (1 − α) ∗ (ai · y0) ≤ bi. Thus,
α ∗ (ai · f(x)− ai · y0) ≤ b− ai · y0. We get a similar upper
(or lower, depending on the sign of ai ·f(x)−ai ·y0) bound
for α for every inequality constraint and then α is the sim-
ply the highest value in [0, 1] that satisfies all these bounds.
All these bounds are closed-form formulas, thus, comput-
ing α is very efficient for the forward pass, and obtaining
y = α ∗ f(x) + (1− α) ∗ y0 is easy.
Gradients: Computing the gradient (for backpropaga-
tion) of α w.r.t. the input f(x) to the mapping layer is also
easy. For readability, we write s instead of f(x). As stated
in the previous paragraph α is the minimum of a number of
upper bounds (ignroing lower bounds), where these upper
bounds are given closed-form functions bi(s) (y0 is a con-
stant). Thus, α = min(1, b1(s), . . . , bk(s)) for some k < m.
For notational ease, let b0(s) = 1. For any specific s0, if
there is a unique index j for which α = bj(s) then the gra-
dient is simply∇bj(s), which is 0 if j = 0. If there is a set of
indices J (|J | > 1) and α = bj(s) for all j ∈ J , then the gra-
dient is simply (1/|J |) ∗ (∑j∈J ∇bj(s)). In practice, these
gradients need not be explicitly calculated and can be han-
dled by automatic symbolic differentiation libraries (Abadi
et al. 2015) instead. Thus, our approach is also simple to
implement.
Handling equality constraints: For equality constraints,
say k constraints, the general approach would be to elim-
inate k variables using Gaussian elimination (or any other
method) and then deal with the only inequalities in this new
space. However, for our TSG problem, we only have one
equality constraint, which is a probability simplex constraint
that can be easily enforced by a softmax layer. With a slight
abuse of notation, we use s to denote the output of the soft-
max whose input is the unconstrained output f(x). s sat-
isfies the probability simplex constraint. Additionally, we
choose y0 such that it also satisfies the probability simplex
constraint. Then, the final output α∗s+(1−α)∗y0 satisfies
the probability simplex constraint and all the inequality con-
straints. Thus, for our problem, the overall mapping is made
of 2 layers: a softmax followed by the α-projection layer.
Choosing an Interior Point
The choice of y0 is important. First, y0 should be an interior
point. Otherwise, if y0 is on an external face (hyperplane) of
the Y polytope, all external points on the side of the face not
containing the polytope will map to y0. This violates non-
zero gradients property of a feasible mapping, as all points
on one side of the hyperplane will have zero gradients. We
also find that we get better performance when y0 is near the
centre of the polytope. While there are many different types
of centres, we choose the Chebyshev centre of a polytope be-
cause: (1) Chebyshev centre can be computed efficiently by
solving a linear program and (b) the Chebyshev centre max-
imizes the minimum distance from the faces of the polytope,
that is, making sure the centre is far from bad points. Infor-
mally, Chebyshev centre is the centre of the largest ball that
fits inside the polytope. Note that we need to compute the
Chebyshev centre only once for our polytope Y and that this
computation time is of the order of seconds.
Experiments
In line with past work on TSGs, we evaluate the performance
of our approach on the airport passenger screening domain.
For the most simple head-to-head comparison, we look at
the difference in solution quality between our approach and
past work within single time-window. Brown et al. (2016)
and McCarthy, Vayanos, and Tambe (2017) both have the
same optimal solution in this case and the optimal marginal
solution can be found by using a simple linear program (LP).
When we compare the solutions of the LP to our approach,
we control for the risk and measure the corresponding differ-
ence in delay. Specifically, we take the different risk levels
associated with the uncontrollable categories ψθ from the
solution of the LP and run our approach using those as the
risk threshold in the risk constraints of our approach. We
then test both sets of policies (LP and ours) using an online
simulator and compare the ratio of average delays obtained.
We construct our problem instances using the descrip-
tion in Brown et al. (2016) and McCarthy, Vayanos, and
Tambe (2017). The attacker utility associated with success-
fully launching an attack U+ is sampled from a uniform dis-
tribution over [1, 10], while the utility of failing to launch an
attack U− is set to 0. The game is zero-sum and, as a result,
the defender utilities are the negation of the attacker utili-
ties. There are 3 attack methods m, 5 uncontrollable scree-
nee risk levels θ and 5 screening resource types |R|. The ef-
ficacies (probability of detection) of different resources are
sampled from a uniform random distribution over [0, 1] for
each attack method. We create 10 random 2-sized combina-
tions of resources to represent the teams T and their effica-
cies are found assuming that the efficacies of their associ-
ated resources are independent. We choose a passenger ar-
rival distribution as used in McCarthy, Vayanos, and Tambe
(2017), and consider arrivals to be normally distributed in a
3-hour window leading up to the departure of the flight. We
combine this with real flight departure times taken from one
of the busiest airports in the world to generate a realistic ar-
rival distribution of passengers. The default number of flight
types for experiments is 10.
Finally, for runtime, all past methods have used non-
gradient based optimization methods and have reported run-
times for programs that have run on CPUs. As has been ob-
served in other domains, GPUs offer a huge advantage due
to the immense parallelization of matrix operations for neu-
ral network optimization. However, to perform a fair com-
parison to past work, we run all our experiments on a CPU.
Thus, while our scalability results show the runtime trend
Figure 2: Static vs. Adaptive: We measure the ratio of av-
erage delays of the LP to average delays of our online ap-
proach (so higher is better) across different problem sizes.
with increasing problem size, the absolute wall clock time
can be much better with GPUs.
Static vs. Adaptive
First, we show that our online approach outperforms past
window-based approaches even when the problem size is
large. The experiments here are evaluated for 30 random
game instances and averaged across 100 samples of passen-
ger arrival sequence. The results can be seen in Figure 2.
For the one time-window problem, improvement in solu-
tion quality comes from the fact that past work has a static
policy within one time-window, whereas our solution can
adapt based on the actual number of passenger arrivals. As a
result, our approach can exploit the structure present within
a time-window. The reason our improvement decreases with
an increase in the number of flights is because, as the prob-
lem size increases, the structure present in a randomly gen-
erated problem decreases. For example, with many overlap-
ping Gaussian distribution of passenger arrivals, the overall
arrival is almost uniform which we show leads to a lower
gain (see Section ).
Moreover, the performance improvement within one
time-window is a lower bound on the amount of improve-
ment we can achieve over past methods. The solution quality
associated with past methods deteriorates with an increase in
the number of windows (details in Section ) while there is no
notion of time windows in our model and hence no degrada-
tion over long periods.
Delay vs. Risk
In Figure 3, we show the inherent trade-off between risk and
average delay by varying ψ (keeping the ratio of ψθ fixed
across θ) and measuring its effect on the delay. To do this,
we take the optimal risk level obtained by solving the LP
and then measure the impact on average delay as we relax
it. The results show average delay as a fraction of the delay
obtained at the LP optimal risk. The resulting curve can be
seen as the Pareto frontier described in Section restricted to
the case where the ratio of ψθ fixed across θ. As expected,
less stringent risk requirements result in lower average delay.
Figure 3: Delay vs. Risk: We measure how the delay de-
creases (as fraction of delay at LP optimal risk) with increas-
ing risk allowance.
Figure 4: Scalability in training steps: We measure the ac-
tor loss of our DDPG network as a function of the number
of mini-batches that are fed to it as input.
Scalability
In Figure 4, we show how training time is affected by the
size of the game instance. Given that neural networks are
not guaranteed optimal, measuring this is slightly challeng-
ing but we use the metric of the time at which our DDPG’s
actor network converges to measure how long the training
time takes. As we see in the figure, the number of steps to
convergence is about the same, regardless of the number of
flights. Based on Figure 4, we choose 10,000 training steps
as the number of steps for convergence.
Of course, as the input size increases with increasing
number of flights, the time taken per training step increases,
thus, the actual wall clock time to get to 10,000 steps for
different number of flights varies. Figure 5 show the actual
wall clock time for convergence (to 10,000 steps) with vary-
ing number of flights. The increase appears linear showing
the scalability of our approach (as a reminder these results
are not even using GPUs). In contrast, past work (Brown et
al. 2016; McCarthy, Vayanos, and Tambe 2017) scale highly
Figure 5: Scalability in actual time:We measure the time in
secs at 10,000 training steps for different number of flights.
Figure 6: Delay vs. Variance: We measure the ratio of de-
lays for policies computed by LP to our approach across dif-
ferent standard deviation for our arrival distribution.
non-linearly with number of flights and have shown solu-
tions only up to 50 flight and 15 flights respectively.
Delay vs. Variance
In Figure 6, we look at how the variance associated with
the passenger arrival distribution affects our gain over the
time window based solutions. Here the x-axis is measured
using 2σ because of the intuition that 95% of passengers of
a flight arrive within a 2 standard deviation window around
the mean. This graph can be interpreted as the effect that
changing the width of the arrival window (of 95% passen-
gers) has on solution quality. We vary it from 0 to 5 hours.
We find that as the variance associated with arrivals in-
creases, the gain obtained by using an online approach as
ours decreases. We believe that this is because the amount
of structure present in the problem decreases as the variance
increases. In the limit, when the variance is infinity, the ar-
rivals are uniformly distributed, memory-less, and resemble
a Poisson process. As a result, there is no information to be
gained whenever the next passenger arrives, hence the per-
passenger adaptive solution would do as good as one per-
time window adaptive solution in this limiting case. Con-
versely, if the same number of flights arrive over a longer
duration, say 24 hours, our algorithm would do consider-
ably better in terms of the average delay since the arrival
windows are less likely to overlap, resulting in smaller over-
all variance.
Conclusion
In summary, we proposed a novel model for threat screen-
ing that captures inherent features of the problem such as
continuous arrival of screenees. We then provided an RL-
based method to solve the model which includes the novel
α-projection method for imposing hard constraints on ac-
tions. We believe these advances make our approach for
threat screening realistic and applicable in practice.
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